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1PHILANTHROPY, THE WELFARE STATE, AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS, 1945-2000.
by
Peter Dobkin Hall
Our understanding of American philanthropy owes more to historical and
institutional mythology than to grounded conceptions of the evolution of the modern
state. On the one hand, these myths posited relations between governmental and private
activity as a zero-sum game, in which increases in the scope and scale of government
diminished the capacities of the private sector. On the other, the philanthropy and other
forms of private social investment have been viewed as diminishing the resources
available for productive enterprise.
Every significant indicator of institutional activity belies these concepts. For
business, the expansion of the central state fostered development of national
transportation, communications, and finance infrastructures by direct subsidy and by legal
and regulatory innovations that placed the national interest over state and local concerns.
Federal subsidy, not private capital, built the transcontinental railroad, which spurred the
consolidation of the nation's fragmented ante bellum railway network. The nationalization
of the telegraph industry during the Civil War created the administrative framework for
integration of the communications infrastructure in the years that followed. The federal
monopoly of postal service after 1848 dramatically reduced the cost of disseminating the
written word and maintaining ties between America's increasingly scattered people.
Federal dollars (notably the Morrill Act of 1862) played an important part in underwriting
2educational institutions that supplied the technological and human resources essential to
large-scale economic enterprise.
The enormous proliferation of voluntary associations, nonprofit organizations, and
private philanthropic paralleled the increasing scope, scale, and activism of the national
government from the 1870s on (Putnam & Gamm, 1999; Skocpol, 1999). During the last
quarter of the nineteenth century, national nonproprietary entities of every kind -- mutual
benefit organizations (fraternal/sororal organizations, veterans groups, labor unions, trade
and professional associations, and national religious denominations), charitable
institutions (the Charity Organization and Community Chest movements, the Red Cross,
and nationally-focused grantmaking foundations) -- "took off" in numbers, wealth, and
influence as the national state began to grow in the 1870s. The most important of these
were national franchise-form organizations whose growth was closely tied to the
expansion of the transportation and communications infrastructures.
Mutually-reinforcing relationships between government and the domains of
private initiative became even more evident in the second half of the twentieth century.
The greatest and most rapid growth for philanthropic and other nonproprietary entities
paralleled the rise of the welfare state in the decades following World War II. Most of
these were nonstock corporations registered with the federal government as charitable
tax-exempt/"nonprofit" organizations. Estimated to number 12,500 in 1939, by the 1967s,
more than 300,000 had registered with the Internal Revenue Service [see Appendix].
Today they number nearly more than 600,000. (During the same period, the total number
3of nonprofits, including charitables, grew from 80,000 to 1.2 million registered
organizations).
Although there is some evidence that older organizations -- both proprietary and
non-proprietary -- changed ownership forms and sought exempt status under federal law,
studies of organizational populations suggest that the vast majority of the philanthropic
and nonprofit entities established after the war were entirely new creations.1
That the nonprofit domain should have expanded so dramatically during this
period is hardly surprising, given the federal government's use of tax and other incentives
to encourage its growth. The G.I. Bill -- a voucher system for veterans -- sparked the
founding of new colleges and universities and the expansion of older ones. As America
settled into its role as defender of the free world, federal subsidies to higher education
came to include scholarships, capital financing and operating support for defense-related
teaching and research, and powerful tax incentives to encourage private philanthropic
giving. Health care, an industry dominated by government-run and proprietary hospitals
before the war, became a predominantly nonprofit domain thanks to federal subsidies for
the construction of "voluntary" hospitals and the growth of public (Social Security) and
private social and health insurance. By the 1970s, the federal government had become the
largest single source of direct and indirect revenues for nonprofits.
Tax policies were unquestionably the most powerful forces shaping the growth of
philanthropic and nonprofit enterprise in the post-war decades. The universalization of
income taxation and withholding in 1942, high tax rates on individual and corporate
4incomes and on estates, and generous tax incentives for giving gave virtually every
American above the poverty level an interest in giving. While the large numbers of "non-
itemizers" who filed tax returns annually suggested that giving was not entirely tax
driven, the impressive growth of philanthropic giving in the post-war years indicates that
tax incentives were playing an increasingly important role in shaping the allocation of
discretionary income, especially among those with higher incomes.
The Growth of the Welfare State and the Transformation of Philanthropy
Curiously, neither average citizens nor policy makers understood the changes
taking place in the architecture and dynamics of economic, political, and social
institutions in the post-war years. This was due to a number of factors.
First, because institutional changes proceeded not from ideologies or clearly
articulated programs -- but, rather, in negotiated increments in which practical politics
and pragmatism tended to shape legislative and policy outcomes: major changes came bit
by bit.
Second, Americans lacked the conceptual frameworks that would have enabled
them to grasp large-scale change. Although the federal government, beginning in the
1920s, had taken major strides towards gathering economic and social statistics, the
relative novelty of economics, sociology, and political science as systematic intellectual
enterprises meant that neither civil servants nor academic social scientists possessed the
analytical capacity to make sense of these data.
5Third, American political and policy discourse -- the conceptual lenses through
which quantitative data would be viewed -- owed more to the political and economic
philosophies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries than to those of the twentieth. The
former tended to emphasize the distinctions between political, economic, and social
domains -- and between individuals and the various collectivities in which they
participated -- rather than offering models of the ways in which they were interrelated and
interdependent. Ideologized conceptions of the rational individual as citizen and as
consumer constituted the legal basis not only of democratic polity and market economy,
but of the academic enterprises through which individuals and institutions were
understood (which, as they developed after the Civil War, fragmented domains of
collective behavior into political science, economics, sociology, psychology, and so on.
Fourth, even as late as the 1940s, American governments lacked the capacity to
frame policy or track its implementation. The practice of budgeting federal expenditures
dated only to 1912. The creation of the National Income Accounts -- the statistical system
that would enable government to envision the scope and scale of national economic
activity -- dated only to 1939. The establishment of government bodies to interpret and
act on these data dated only to the immediate post-war years. And even then, the lack of
technologies that could integrate and analyze large bodies of economic and social data
posed a formidable obstacle to these serving as knowledge that was "usable" for policy
purposes.
Nowhere did these ideational, technological, and administrative deficits show
themselves more powerfully than in the inability of legislators, policy makers, journalists,
6and academics to discern the character of the welfare state they were creating in the years
following the war.
Economic planners wrote confidently of the necessity for central planning to
stabilize the economy, to promote planning, and to facilitate mobilization in the event of
war -- without more than a hazy understanding of the interrelationships of economy,
polity, and society. Although tax policy was being used to stimulate and target private
financial and philanthropic investment by the 1940s, there was no systematic assessment
of the efficacy of these efforts before the mid-1970s. In other words, policy makers were,
in effect, "flying blind."
In 1947, as part of an effort to create the fiscal and economic planning capacities
needed to sustain the emergent national security/welfare state, Congress undertook the
first comprehensive effort to overhaul the Internal Revenue Code – the process that would
not be completed until 1954 (Feingold 1961). The unexpected outcomes of tax policies
enacted during and after the war – excess profits and steeply progressive income taxes --
became subjects of congressional enquiry. Charitable vehicles were being used for large-
scale tax avoidance, with foundations being used as holding companies and charities
acquiring manufacturing firms claiming them as tax-exempt (the gift of the Mueller
Macaroni Company, the nation’s largest pasta manufacturer, to the New York University
Law School, sparked particular outrage  (Committee on Ways and Means 1948, 3395-
3553; Special Committee 1954; "Macaroni Monopoly" 1968).
7In the early 1950s, congressional committees subjected "foundations and other tax
exempt entities" to closer scrutiny.  Though driven in part by Cold War anxieties about
domestic subversion, the committees also displayed genuine puzzlement and concern
about the growing numbers and influence of "charitable" entities whose activities seemed
to go well beyond any conventional conception of charitable, educational, or religious
enterprise. Exempt enterprises were being established in great numbers and for novel
purposes -- but the only language and concepts available to describe the phenomenon
were terms like "philanthropy" and "charity" -- which, even at that early date, were
inadequate descriptors of tax exempt entities that, increasingly, drew their revenues from
government grants and contracts and sales of services rather than from donations and
bequests.
Those within the world of philanthropy were no better equipped than those
outside of it to grasp unfolding changes. When major foundations, responding to the pleas
of F. Emerson Andrews (the Russell Sage Foundation executive who was the most
knowledgeable student of nonprofit enterprise of the era), convened a conference of
scholars at Princeton to draft a research agenda for the study of this domain, they could
come up with nothing better than the term "philanthropy" to encompass their range of
interests (Andrews 1956, 1973).
In retrospect, it is difficult to understand how sophisticated scholars and
executives of major organized charities could fail to notice the extent to which such
things as multi-million dollar grantmaking foundations and universities, the national
religious denominations, and such new charitable vehicles as community chests and
8community foundations differed from the voluntary associations celebrated by De
Tocqueville a century and a quarter earlier. While their emphasis on the continuities
between traditional forms of voluntarism and modern philanthropic enterprise may have
been self-serving, it seems more likely that it was due to a failure of vision. (It's worth
keeping in mind that systematic compilations of foundations and their assets wouldn't
begin until after the Princeton Conference -- and that the IRS would not begin gathering
and publishing data on tax-exempt entities for another decade!).
An analogous failure of vision was the inability to understand fully the nature of
the postwar welfare/warfare state -- because, as Lester Salamon has argued, their
"conceptual lenses" (and ideological predispositions) did not permit them to appreciate
the synergies between government and the private sectors, which they envisioned as a
zero-sum game in which expansion of government meant restriction of the private
domain -- and visa versa (Salamon 1987).
When they did try to address these synergies -- as did such social critics as C.
Wright Mills (1959), G. William Domhoff (1967, 1970, 1979), Gabriel Kolko (1962),
and Ferdinand Lundberg (1968) -- using similarly inadequate lenses, they focused on the
growing power of a national ruling class, failing to grasp that while elite power was
growing, it was also being segmented into specialized inter-institutional relationships
between interested constituencies. None saw the extent to which the state itself was
undergoing fundamental changesn -- largely because their commitment to rational choice
models of explanation, which viewed organizations and agencies as driven by utility
9maximization and intentionality, prevented them from examining inter-organizational
relationships.3
Although Salamon's model of the nonprofit sector as a manifestation of "third
party government" -- the peculiar American form of the welfare state in which public
purposes were achieved through non-governmental instrumentalities --, it did not fully
describe the implications of the emergent public-private relationship. While Salamon was
attentive to the extent of government support for nonprofits, he ignored the political and
administrative mechanisms through which such subsidies were mediated.
These, Webber and Wildavsky suggest, stemmed from a transformation in
systems of federal government budgeting and expenditure.  Though the twentieth century
began with the federal government in an activist posture (trust-busting, military
expansion, the federal reserve system, and a host of regulatory commissions), it was not
until the 1930s, when major shifts in economic thinking legitimated large-scale
government intervention in the economy, that the activist state began to develop fiscal
practices consistent with its enlarged role (Webber & Wildavsky 1986, 453) -- and not
until after the second World War that these practices become fully institutionalized.
Reflecting deep-seated popular preferences, federal fiscal policy had traditionally
been concerned with limiting and controlling the scope and scale of government. But
after the war, when the nation assumed responsibilities not only as leader of the Free
World, but also as the preeminent manager of the domestic economy (on whose stability
the former depended), the emphasis in budgeting and spending shifted from balancing
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revenues and expenditures to being strategic and policy-driven. "The process of
budgeting," Webber and Wildavsky write, "became introspective rather than critical. The
question of 'How much?' was transmuted into 'What for?' (478)." As the federal
government's efforts to stabilize the economy and maintain combat readiness through
military, social, and economic mobilization, agencies and programs proliferated.
With the virtually unlimited revenues available through universalized income
taxation and deficit spending (indeed, the government's borrowing capacity itself became
an  important economic management tool), budgeting ceased to be a zero-sum game in
which one agency's gain was another's loss. Despite increasingly sophisticated oversight
capacities and the creation of new policymaking and monitoring bodies (the Council of
Economic Advisors, the Office of Management and Budget), the budgetary process
became less rather than more centralized. Because most federal policies were
implemented not by the federal government itself, but by an assortment of agencies that
interfaced with the states, localities, and private sector actors that actually carried out
these policies, each area of activity developed its own internal and external
constituencies: agency officials pushing to expand their resources and prerogatives,
congressial and other elected officials who stood to gain from spending and hiring by
government agencies, and organized beneficiary groups -- "special interests" -- which
lobbied congress, contributed to electoral campaigns, mobilized voters, and sought to
influence public opinion through advertising and journalism.
Not only were nonprofits as recipients of direct and indirect subsidies
beneficiaries of these funding relationships they played increasingly important roles in
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formulating and advocating for particular policies. As traditional understandings of
philanthropy and charity became blurred by the proliferation of new nonprofit entities,
advocacy activities that in the past would have been carried on through trade associations,
came to be the province of national mass membership associations with 501(c)(3) status
(like the National Audubon Society, the Sierra Club, and the American Association of
Retired Persons) (on these, see Putnam, in press). Charitable tax-exempt status not only
cloaked the causes these entities promoted in an aura of disinterested public-servingness,
but, because donations to them were deductible, attractive to foundations, corporations,
and individual donors large and small.
Though classed as membership organizations, these new entities little resembled
the national associations of the pre-war decades (fraternal and sororal, veterans, and
patriotic groups). The post-war associations had no social dimension: members seldom if
ever met face-to-face, individually or collectively. Membership became a political and
financial act, not a social commitment.
More importantly, in terms of its political role, the emergent charitable tax-
exempt universe of the postwar era differed dramatically from its associational domain of
earlier decades. In the past, when national associations, foundations, think tanks, and
other philanthropically-supported entities sought to influence government, they generally
did so as outsiders. In the postwar decades, associations, now enjoying the benefits of
charitable tax-exempt status, increasingly became -- if not extensions of government itself
-- intrinsic part of the organizational field of public governance. The relationship between
the Brookings Institution and the government which produced the Social Security Act in
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the 1930s was exceptional.4 By the late 1950s, such relationships were becoming
routinized not only on the institutional level (with government contracting with think
tanks for all manner of policy and technical services) but on the individual level (as
professional careers moved individuals from universities to operating and grantmaking
foundations or business corporations to government agencies and congressional staffs --
and sometimes to elective office.5
A Period of Confusion and Fear, 1959-1969
The universalization of income taxation was a necessary concommitant of the
shift in the politics of budgeting and expenditure and the emergence of third party
government that so favored the growth of private giving and the proliferation of
foundations and other exempt organizations. Although the income tax had been in place
since 1916, few Americans earned enough to have to file returns or make payments to the
federal government.  Beginning in 1935, the burden of taxation became steadily more
onerous. In that year, Congress made tax rates on income and inheritances steeply
progressive -- placing particular burdens on the wealthy. During the war, Congress
universalized the income tax and the practice of withholding and added to corporate
liability with a steep excess profits tax. Inevitably, Americans -- individual and corporate,
wealthy and middle-class -- became more tax sensitive and this sensitivity began to shape
their patterns of charitable giving, estate planning, and other economic behaviors.
While this had the desired effect of encouraging the growth in number and size of
foundations and other tax-exempt entities, it also produced an unanticipated political
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backlash, as the public perceived the tax privileges of the wealthy and the growing wealth
of foundations as unequitable.6 Public disquiet began to come to a head in the 1960s,
thanks to congressional gadflies like Texas populist Wright Patman and Harvard
professor Stanley Surrey, who President Kennedy had appointed to head the tax section of
the Department of Treasury.
 In July of 1959, after intense lobbying by the Rockefeller family, the Senate
Finance Committee recommended expanding the unlimited charitable deduction
provision of the tax code -- an item that permitted individuals who gave a certain
proportion of their incomes to exempt organizations to entirely avoid paying income
taxes. An influential minority on the committee -- which included senators Russell Long,
Albert Gore, and Eugene McCarthy --, issued a sharply worded dissent, charging that the
proposal would dangerously erode the tax base by encouraging "a proliferation of
foundations. . . established by individuals and families. Noting that 87% of the 13,000
foundations then in existence had been created since 1940 and that 1,200 new ones were
being created annually, the senators warned that "at present rates of establishment,
substantial control of our economy may soon rest in the 'dead hands' of such
organizations, endangering "the free choices presented by the marketplace and by the
democratic processes of a free government, free economy, and a free society" (U.S.
Senate 1961, 7-8).
What started as an effort to encourage giving by the wealthy soon spun out of
control into a broader debate over whether private philanthropy was obsolete in an era
when government had assumed primary responsibility for public welfare and whether, if
14
permitted at all, should be limited only to gifts to organizations that could demonstrate
broad public support.
Senatorial skepticism was soon joined by outcries from the House, where
Representative Patman initiated a series of attacks on foundations that would continue
through the decade. His speeches and the published reports of his Small Business
Committee received wide press coverage. And public concern was further intensified by
best sellers like Ferdinand Lundberg's The Rich and the Super-Rich (1969), which drew
on Patman's findings.7
In the face of rising congressional and public demands, the Department of
Treasury in 1965 circulated a set of proposals recommending major changes in the rules
governing foundations, including prohibitions on business dealings between donors and
the foundations they established, limits on foundation control of businesses, restrictions
on the deductibility of donor-controlled gifts, and regulation of the representation of
donors and their families on foundation boards (U.S. Department of Treasury 1965).
Regulatory enthusiasm fueled the emergence of self-awareness in the fragmented
philanthropic domain. Earlier in the century, philanthropic and charitable activists,
political reformers, and socially-concerned academics had been closely linked through
such organizations as the National Conference of Charities and Corrections and the
National Civic Federation. But the expansion in the range of purposes of charitable
organizations, the growing assumption of welfare responsibilities by government
(especially after 1933), and the institutionalization of social work, public administration,
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and the academic professions -- as well as the dying off of the founding generation of
American philanthropists and charities leaders -- had rendered encompassing networks of
this kind obsolete. By the 1930s, academics, professionals, business executives, and
charitable administrators organized into specialized associations that represented and
articulated their particular interests.
Another factor in this was growing secularization and religious diversity: earlier
unity had been based on the common evangelical Protestantism of most charitable,
educational, professional, organizational, and community leaders. By the 1920s,
Protestantism had broken into conservative evangelical and liberal modernist factions.
Because Jews and Catholics had been excluded from leadership in the charitable
mainstream, they had created parallel philanthropic and charitable organizations. As
universities and government became more secular, they attracted academic professionals
and civil servants who were increasingly likely to view religion as a divisive and
reactionary force. By the 1960s, organized religion, which had half a century earlier
constituted the core of charitable and philanthropic enterprise, was endeavoring to
distance itself from the secular tax-exempt domain in hope of evading the regulatory tidal
wave.
Under the circumstances, unity of purpose even among foundations and the major
national charities would prove elusive. In a 1964 memorandum pondering the formation
of "a possible national association of foundations," Rockefeller family associate Raymond
Lamontagne doubted that the existing contenders for philanthropic leadership -- the
Foundation Library Center (which published The Foundation Directory and a magazine,
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Foundation News), the Council on Foundations (a national trade association that had
recently changed its name from the National Council on Community Foundations), the
National Information Bureau (a kind of Better Business Bureau for nonprofit
organizations and donors), the New York University Conference on Charitable
Foundations, or the half dozen regional conferences of foundations -- could ever be
persuaded either to merge into a single entity or to recognize the "need for and advantages
of such an association."8
Despite halting institutionally-based efforts to frame a common vision of
philanthropy's mission and purposes, individuals were weaving networks of conversation
and enquiry that would ultimately become the basis for a new understanding of the tax-
exempt universe. The most important of these was the 501(c)(3) Group, a loose network
of tax lawyers, trade association and foundation staff, and executives of national charities
formed to exchange information about the technical dimensions of the tax code as it
affected charitable tax-exempt organizations but who, as the regulatory winds increased
in velocity after 1965 began to concern itself with more substantive policy issues.
Technocratic rather than ideological in orientation, members of the group tended
to define issues in economic and legal terms rather than political ones -- an approach not
shared by the top leadership of grantmaking foundations. (As one of these would lament
to another in the early 1970s, "has charity become all law? Is it irretrievably committed to
lawyers instead of its traditional practitioners?").  Word of the group's activities became
known to the staffers in the Rockefeller family office whom John D. Rockefeller 3rd had
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enlisted in his increasingly anxious search for concepts and organizational vehicles that
might reunify the philanthropic community.
The lack of a unified and coherent understanding of contemporary philanthropy
became embarrassingly evident during congressional hearings on the 1969 Tax Reform
Act, which proposed to incorporate many of the suggested reforms of the previous
decade. The heads of the major foundations offered coordinated defenses of foundation
autonomy, evoking hallowed traditions of American voluntarism and warning against the
evils of "government control" and actions that would "discourage individual charitable
giving."  Their unyielding posture on the one hand and their inability to speak the new
economistic language of public policy on the other, won them few friends. In the end,
Congress adopted tax reforms which restricted excess business holdings, regulated donor
control, mandated payout levels, curtailed political activity, allocated tax privileges
according to tests of public support, and required detailed annual filings of activities from
all secular exempt entities with incomes over a certain level.
Ironically, no one in the late 1960s really grasped the changing nature of  the
eleemosynary universe. Neither the government's tax policy makers nor philanthropy's
spokesmen understood the ways in which the peculiar features of America's allocative
welfare state had tied government and private enterprise together. Each side persisted in
seeing the other as autonomous actors: its defenders viewed philanthropy as endangered
by the growth of Big Government; its detractors viewed philanthropy as a threat to
economic and political democracy. Both, though aware of the growing number of exempt
entities (thanks to the fact that the IRS had begun tabulating numbers of organizations
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registered as nonprofit), none comprehended the ways in which the accelerating pace of
government expansion correlated with proliferating numbers of nonprofit organizations.
Nor -- because they didn't understand the differences between traditional donative
voluntary associations and contemporary nonprofits (which were increasingly likely to be
commercial enterprises supported by user fees and grants and contracts from public and
private agencies) -- did they intuit the ways in which one of the most significant
expressions of the expansion of government was the dramatic growth of the nonprofit
domain.
From Philanthropy to Nonprofit Sector
If the passage TRA69 left most philanthropic leaders in a state of shock, it
energized those who understood the urgent need to reexamine and reconceptualize
charitable tax-exempt activity -- the 501(c)(3) Group and John D. Rockefeller 3rd's and
his associates.
Even before the ink was dry on the tax reform bill, the Rockefeller group had
convened a blue ribbon commission on foundations and philanthropy, seeking to conduct
a broad survey of philanthropic practices. This survey of the opinions and attitudes of
foundation leaders proved to be a dead end as far as new ideas were concerned. Another
seemingly unrelated Rockefeller initiative -- a set of surveys of youth attitudes undertaken
as JDR3 struggled to understand the radical activism on America's campuses and in his
own family circle -- would prove to be far more productive. By the mid-1970s,
Rockefeller would begin to view grassroots social change movements with their emphasis
on voluntary action and more traditional kinds of philanthropy as comprising a "second
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American revolution" based on "private initiatives in the public interest" (Rockefeller,
1974). In doing so, he and his associates began to grasp the extent to which
"philanthropy" involved not only grant making foundations, but a vast universe of entities
that were neither governmental nor profit-seeking.
The 501(c)(3) Group started from a very different set of interests -- primarily
concerned with tax and regulatory issues -- viewed through the lenses of law and
economics. Recognizing that any defense of philanthropy would have to be grounded in
the new economistic language of public policy, they began reviewing the extant literature
on tax policy and charitable giving. Considering it seriously flawed and hopelessly
ambiguous, they (with secret funding from the Rockefeller family) commissioned
Harvard economist Martin Feldstein, who had earlier done promising work on health
economics, to conduct a new study on the question of whether and, if so, how tax policy
affected giving.
When word of Feldstein's findings, which powerfully affirmed the impacts of tax
policy, reached the Rockefeller Family office, JDR3rd's associates went into action to
make sure that their implications became as widely known as possible. Working quietly
behind the scenes, they began lining up political support within the Department of
Treasury and among key congressional tax policy staff for a "Commission on Private
Philanthropy and Public Needs" and, when this was in place, set about recruiting those
who would serve on the commission, a staff, and the consultants and researchers who
would give its activities substance.
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The Filer Commission (as it came to be known) was chaired by John Filer, CEO
of the Aetna Insurance Company, and included present and former university presidents
(William Bowen of Princeton, Edwin Etherington of Wesleyan, and Elizabeth
McCormack of Hunter), representatives of major tax exempt industries (Bayard Ewing of
United Way, Walter McNerney of the American Hospital Association, and Alan Pifer of
the Carnegie Corporation), leading businessmen (Filer of Aetna, Walter Haas of Levi,
Straus, Ralph Lazarus of Federated Department Stores, and investment banker C.
Douglas Dillon), as well as religious and political leaders like George Romney and Rev.
Leon Sullivan. Carefully balanced politically, religiously, ethnically, and regionally, the
only conspicuous omission from the group were foundation leaders. The composition of
the group made clear the fact that "philanthropy" was actively being redefined to include
donees as well as donors.
Despite the best efforts of Rockefeller and his staff, the profound differences in
the ways even leading American viewed philanthropy became evident early on. Sessions
devoted to forging agreement on fundamental principles were stormy. When the
Commission issued its recommendations in 1975 under the title Giving in America:
Toward a Stronger Voluntary Sector, it was accompanied by vigorous dissents from
commission members and researchers (which appeared as an appendix to the volume and,
at greater length, in the first of the six volumes of research papers the Commission would
issue in 1977) (Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, 1977).
Despite decensus, one area of agreement was clear: "philanthropy" had been
definitively reframed within a "sector" of "voluntary" entities and activities. Most
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commissioners also agreed on the need for continuing study and discussion of the issues
and, to this end, recommended the establishment by Congress of a "permanent national
commission" -- a quasi-governmental entity with "broad public membership" to gather
information and shape regulatory policy towards the "nonprofit sector."
It appears that Rockefeller and his advisors envisioned the creation of an
"organizational field" of government agencies, regulatory bodies, trade associations, and
nonprofit industries and other organized constituencies that would function much as
similar configurations of interests had under the system of third part government -- acting
together as an advocate within government for the universe of charitable tax-exempt
institutions. Unfortunately, Rockefeller and his associates had misjudged the depth of
popular disenchantment with this system of decision making and with the liberal credo
with which it had come to be associated.
Had a Republican been elected to the presidency in 1976, Rockefeller's "Bureau of
Philanthropy" might well have been established. But the Carter administration --
representing viewpoints not shaped by decades of Beltway cronyism and hence, deeply
skeptical of conventional regulatory processes -- were not about to sponsor the creation of
yet another industry-dominated regulatory commission. Though disappointed, Rockefeller
and his allies were not discouraged. They began working towards the creation of a private
organization that could serve as a "common meeting ground" for the contentious factions
of the charitable tax-exempt universe -- an organization that would be named
INDEPENDENT SECTOR (IS) when finally established in 1980.
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As originally conceived, IS reflected JDR3rd's broad and inclusive conception of
the voluntary domain, as well as the political realities of the factious world of organized
charity.  It was to be a minimally-staffed membership organization with little capacity to
promulgate legislative or research agendas. But with Rockefeller's untimely death in
1978, leadership of the effort passed to a group around former Carnegie Corporation
president and HEW Secretary John W. Gardner, who had little patience with "bottom-up"
decision making and participatory democracy. Gardner's protégé, Brian O'Connell,
quickly moved IS into a trade association mode, with strong staff leadership backed up by
the clout of the major grantmakers who, at the outset, comprised the new organization's
core membership.9
This shift is perhaps understandable, given the challenges that nonprofits would
face on the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. Declaring his intention to slash
government social spending in order to free communities and community groups of the
burdens of Big Government, Reagan constituted both an opportunity and a threat for the
nonprofit world. Certainly Reagan's rhetoric appealed to traditional ideas about the
intrinsic opposition of public and private initiatives -- and, to the extent that these were
still widely embraced by the leaders of American foundations and charities, they were
applauded. Thus, when the President organized a Task Force on Private Sector Initiatives
chaired by industrialist William Verity (the Verity Commission) to stimulate higher levels
of corporate giving, E. B. Knauft, John Filer's right hand man at Aetna and former Filer
Commission top executive, joined it as Staff Director.
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On the donee side there was considerably less enthusiasm for Reaganism. Not
only would proposed reduced tax rates be likely to diminish incentives for giving, major
cuts in social expenditure would cripple nonprofits that had become increasingly
dependent on government grants and contracts. These included colleges and universities,
for whom federal funds constituted nearly a third of annual revenues and human services
organizations, for whom direct federal money constituted nearly all of their incomes, but
virtually all tax-exempt enterprises except religious bodies. These fears were
substantiated by the work of Urban Institute researchers Lester Salamon and Alan
Abramson who, in a 1981 study financed by the 501(c)(3) Group, provided a sweeping
assessment of the extent to which the supposedly "independent" sector was in fact almost
entirely dependent on direct government subsidy (Salamon & Abramson 1981, 1982).
Although Salamon, working with teams of researchers, later further substantiated
the extent of nonprofit/government interdependence through an impressive series of
studies of state and local nonprofit sectors -- and gave eloquent voice to the need for new
theoretical perspectives that would allow more informed understandings of this
relationship (Salamon 1987) --, neither the sector's leaders nor the growing community of
nonprofits researchers were able to bring themselves to abandon conventional dualistic
conceptions of the state and "philanthropy." Despite adopting economistic rhetoric, they
continued to cling -- in spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary -- to political and
social assumptions about the donative, voluntary, and essentially "independent" character
of the nonprofit sector.
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Nonprofit and philanthropic trade associations were similarly resistant to warnings
from researchers about the increasingly commercial character of the sector. In 1980,
Henry Hansmann, a Yale graduate student in law and economics (and a founding member
of Yale's Program on Non-Profit Organizations), began publishing a remarkable series of
papers that sought to delineate a theoretical framework for the tax and regulatory
treatment of tax-exempt entities. Though his own intellectual goals were more ambitious
-- he was attempting to set forth a comprehensive theory of ownership -- his ideas offered
what appeared to be uniquely powerful economic rationales for the existence of
nonprofits based on the ideas of contract and market failure -- the one suggesting that the
inherent "trustworthiness" of nonprofits overcame information asymmetries between
providers and clients in regard to certain kinds of public goods, the other asserting that
the character of these goods, which precluded providers from fully capturing the benefits
of selling them and purchasers the benefits of exclusive ownership (Hansmann 1980,
1981a, 1981b, 1985, 1984, 1985a, 1985b, 1987a, 1987b, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c, 1996).
Although the philanthropic world found much to like in Hansmann's work --
particularly his emphasis on the "trustworthiness" of nonprofits and his portrayal of a
seemingly ironclad economic rationale for their existence --, it also found much to dislike
-- particularly Hansmann's suggestion that nonprofits which generated most of their
revenues through commercial activity ought to be treated differently from truly charitable
donative entities. At a dinner for research funders in 1983, the head of a major trade
association denounced Hansmann's work as "the stupidest thing that I have ever heard."10
It would take another decade and a half for sector leaders to begin to appreciate
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Hansmann's concerns about commercialization of their once non-charitable domain
(INDEPENDENT SECTOR 1999).
Though philanthropy's leaders began the decade with a sense of crisis, convinced
that the Tax Reform Act of 1969 represented the end of the great postwar period of
growth for foundations and other exempt entities, as the years passed it regained its self-
confidence. While there were still episodic skirmishes with the New Right over such
things as unfair competition between nonprofits and for-profits (Small Business
Administration, 1983; "Unfair Competition," 1984), the liberal tilt of grantmaking by big
foundations (Capitol Research Council), and foundation policies and practices with
regard to such things as affirmative action, on the whole nonprofit industry leaders found
the Reagan administration's permissiveness about lobbying and advocacy by nonprofits
very much to its liking. The embrace of nonprofit instrumentalities by the New Right and
by southern and western wealth, while complicating the task of formulating broad
consensus on the goals of philanthropy, seemed to be fueling a new spurt of growth in
giving and foundation formation, particularly on the state and local levels.
Anti-Institutionalism and the Rise of the Nonprofit Sector
It seems unlikely that conservative political and religious movements that, even at
their peaks, never commanded the support of anything approaching a majority of
Americans, could by themselves caused the dismantling of the liberal state. The so-called
"Conservative Revolution" was only one element of a deep, cross-cutting, and largely
apolitical disenchantment with government, established authority, and large
organizations.
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John D. Rockefeller 3rd may have discerned the spirit of the times more
accurately than the pundits of the 60s and 70s (who viewed the Counterculture and the
"Me Generation" as phenomena of the Left) when he labeled its curious combination of
radical individualism, spirituality, voluntarism, and entrepreneurialism as a "second
American revolution" that transcended conventional political categories.
Significantly, the "common meeting ground" for both Left and Right was the
emerging "Third Sector," which offered organizational vehicles through which private
values could be translated into public ones without the necessity for compromise and
accommodation required by political and governmental processes.  Management guru
Peter Drucker accurately captured the ethos of the revolution in 1989, when he described
how the "nonprofit organizations of the so-called third sector" had become "creators of
new bonds of community" for members of a generation that had abandoned "the political
culture of mainstream society," where "individuals, no matter how well-educated, how
successful, how achieving, or how wealthy" could "only vote and pay taxes. . . only react,
. . . only be passive." The "counterculture of the third sector," he wrote, offered arenas of
privatized activism in which individuals could exercise influence, discharge
responsibilities, and make decisions in uniquely effectual and satisfying ways.
Underlying this shift in forms of civic engagement were more fundamental
alterations in civic paradigms. Where the liberal ethos had posited a conception of the
"Common Good" in which individuals' pursuit of their interests was constrained by
commitments that transcended self-interest (what Tocqueville called "self-interest rightly
27
understood), the post-liberal ethos dismissed the notion of the collective and the public as
elitist, defining the "Common Good" as the aggregate outcome of private purposes.
Viewed over the long term, tensions between these two orientations (Wildavsky and
Webber label the first orientation "hierarchical" and the second "sectarian") ran through
all of American history in struggles between Federalists and Jeffersonians and Whigs and
Jacksonians in the ante bellum decades, between Republicans and Democrats between the
Civil War and the Progressive Era, and between proponents and opponents of federal
government activism for most of the twentieth century. Indeed, it was the very power of
this tension that had shaped the post-World War II welfare state as allocative rather than
bureaucratic.
But by the late 1980s, the anti-statist pronouncements of conservative polemicists
and academics like Ayn Rand and Milton Friedman -- opposition to public schools, to
government regulation, to social welfare programs, to corporate social responsibility --
once dismissed as "irritable gestures that pass for thought" -- came to be embraced as
legitimate alternatives to the discredited ideas and institutions of American liberalism.
The private philanthropy and the "nonprofit organizations of the so-called third
sector" played a key role in this transformation. Through the 1970s, philanthropic and
nonprofit organizations had been dominated by liberals with close ties to government and
their activities had generally been framed by liberal political and social agendas.
Regarding foundations and "other tax-exempt entities" as the instrumentalities of the
liberal elite, conservatives not only rejected philanthropy, but led efforts curtail their
power.
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In the 1970s, conservatives began to view philanthropy in a different light. A
number of factors account for this shift. Perhaps the most important of these was
economic and demographic: the postwar economic boom and the growth of new defense-
related industries had empowered groups -- non-WASP religious conservatives, many of
them from the South and West -- that had traditionally been excluded from the centers of
institutional influence. Brought into government by Richard Nixon, who in his "new
Nixon" incarnation had tapped the growing strength of Republican conservatism to secure
the 1968 presidential nomination, this group -- represented by people like financier
William E. Simon, economist Alan Greenspan, and defense contractor/corporate lawyer
Caspar Weinberger -- combined deeply conservative convictions with extraordinary
sophistication about governmental and corporate institutions. Despite his personal
distaste for its liberal orientation, Simon, in his role as Secretary of Treasury, played the
role of political guardian angel and institutional sponsor to the Filer Commission -- and in
so doing served as a key boundary spanner between the liberal and conservative wings of
American philanthropy.
Simon was a man of many interests -- and was in important respects as significant
a figure for emergent conservative philanthropy as John D. Rockefeller 3rd was for liberal
philanthropy. Like Rockefeller, Simon had his own inner circle of advisors -- among
them public intellectual and journalist Irving Kristol and philanthropoid Leslie
Lenkowsky. At Kristol's urging, Simon bankrolled the establishment of the Institute for
Educational Affairs (IEA). While IEA originally attracted notice as the sponsor and
funder of conservative student publications on traditionally liberal college and university
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campuses, in the early 1980s, it also served as a platform for efforts by conservative
philanthropists to promote a conservative philanthropic agenda.
In 1982, acting on the belief that self-policing of abuses might serve as an
effective defense against further outbursts of congressional regulatory enthusiasm, liberal
leaders of the Council on Foundations attempted to adopt a code of "principles and
practices" for grantmakers that included provisions (such as endorsements of affirmative
action goals) that were unacceptable to conservative grantmakers. Rebuffed in their
efforts to prevent the adoption of the code, the IEA attempted to lead conservative
grantmakers our of the liberally-tilted Council on Foundations, appealing not only to
committed conservatives, but also to middle-of-the-road corporate grantmakers. Although
the effort to create a conservative philanthropic trade association failed, many of the
executives and scholars involved in the effort formed an active and articulate group of
voices for conservative grantmaking that, through Philanthropy Roundtable, would have
an enduring and increasing influence on the way philanthropy and nonprofits were
understood. At the same time, they helped to promote the idea that philanthropy could
serve conservative as well as liberal agendas.
The IEA was only one of a host of efforts to institutionalize conservative
philanthropy. After the election of Ronald Reagan, think tanks like the American
Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation became the conservative counterparts of
such traditional liberal policy bastions as the Brookings Institution, the Twentieth Century
Fund, and the Urban Institute. Like the liberals, the conservatives cultivated relationships
to universities, funding research and drawing like-minded academics into the policy
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process. And these efforts were sustained by the growing number and wealth of
conservative foundations. And outside the inner circle of establishmentarian conservative
thinks tanks were arrayed smaller entities, focused on particular issues, that functioned as
the ideological conscience of the new right's intellectual empire.
A Thousand Points of Light -- and Beyond: The Triumph of the Nonprofit Sector
and the Disappearance of Civic Space
George Bush's speech accepting the Republican presidential nomination in 1988,
in which he called for the dismantling of big government and the nurturing of "a thousand
points of light," marked the definitive moment at which American conservatism as a
whole embraced the possibilities of philanthropy and other forms of private voluntarism.
Even though Christian conservatives and other further to the right remained suspicious of
Bush, their commitment to the possibilities of philanthropic and nonprofit
instrumentalities became evident in the activities of congressional leaders like Newt
Gingrich, who were energetically creating new nonprofits to promote their legislative
agendas and to attract donors to the conservative vision of institutional reconstruction.
Conservative engagement in philanthropy and nonprofits and the use of these
instrumentalities for explicitly political purposes had the effect of blurring the lines
between political donations and charitable giving.
The blurring of boundaries between left and right, charitable and commercial,
political and non-political activities was substantive as well and institutional. One of the
most important areas of organizational growth in the 80s was involved the dismantling of
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state institutions for the mentally disabled and the placement of the disabled in
community-based group homes. The movement had begun in the late 1960s, as an off-
shoot of the civil rights movement. Although the litigation that led to
deinstitutionalization was spearheaded by liberals associated with the American Civil
Liberties Union's Disablities Rights Project, the effort to create alternative settings for the
disabled was based on a loose alliance of right and left-wing critics of the medico-legal
establishment, religious conservatives (including members of religious orders
decloistered by Vatican II, Ultra-Orthodox Jews, and fundamentalist Protestants), and
libertarians of various persuasions, who advocated the creation of systems of nonprofit --
rather than government-run -- group homes. While stoutly resisted by organized
psychiatry and social work, labor unions, and many liberal politicians, this unlikely
partnership of left and right litigated relentlessly against reluctant state agencies on the
one hand and neighborhood opponents (NIMBYs) on the other. What ultimately carried
the day was the fact that politicians of all persuasions eventually recognized the enormity
of the patronage resource represented by a program that would steer billions of dollars
into acquiring, renovating, and operating group homes. (Overall, the creation of the
alternative system of care for the disabled amounted to nearly as great a public
expenditure as had the construction of the interstate highway system).
The oddity of the alliance is suggested by the character of Covenant House, one of
the most prominent early beneficiaries of privatized social welfare services. Founded by
Father Bruce Ritter, a member of the Franciscan Order, as a refuge for runaway teenagers,
Covenant House boasted a board composed of New York's most prominent and
politically-connected Catholic laymen, including William E. Simon and Peter Grace.
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Although noted as a pioneer in direct mail fundraising (the House distributed millions of
copies of a paperback book entitled Sometimes God Has a Kid's Face), the bulk of its
revenues came from government grants and contracts. In its focus on the homeless young
and its dependence on government largesse, Covenant House was grounded in the
charitable counterculture of the left; in its aggressive marketing and reliance on right
wing political connections, it was no less firmly rooted in the political culture of
conservatism. At the same time, it was no less grounded in the post-Vatican II
transformation of cloistered religious orders into platforms for alternative ministries to
the disabled and dependent -- a movement deeply offensive to much of the Catholic right.
The welfare reform of the mid-1990s did not -- like Minerva from Zeus -- spring
fully formed from Newt Gingrich's forehead. Rather, these legislative initiatives brought
together strands of thought and action that had been evolving on the state and local levels
for the previous twenty years: deep distrust of large institutions (particularly
governmental ones) and politics; the spiritualization of social service (evident in the rise
of parachurch organizations like Habitat for Humanity); the emergence of alternative
religious ministries for which service and caregiving were primary forms of devotional
activity; a definition of the causes of poverty from an emphasis on conditions to an
emphasis on character. In one form or another, these views had been entertained by
influential groups across the political spectrum who found by the  mid-nineties that --
despite deep-seated historical animosities -- they could form consensus such issues as
expanding the prerogatives of religious institutions (the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1994), direct government funding of faith-based service provision (the Personal
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Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act of 1996), advocacy by nonprofits, and
turning key government functions over to nonprofit groups, secular and religious.
Because tensions still existed within the new Republican majority between its
Main Street and Wall Street wings, the old conservatives populist hostility to nonprofits
periodically surfaced in the form of debates over further limiting the advocacy activities
of nonprofits, unfair competition with for-profit businesses, and the supposed anti-
capitalism of some grassroots and progressive groups. But a Republican leadership that
owed its power to a significant degree to its adroit use of nonprofit vehicles in policy
making (American Enterprise Institute, Heritage Foundation), propagandizing (Christian
Coalition), and campaign financing (Newt Gingrich's GOPAC) seemed hardly likely to
kill the goose that laid its golden egg.
Ironically, philanthropy/nonprofit trade groups like the Council on Foundations
and INDEPENDENT SECTOR, which had traditionally identified themselves with
Democratic-liberal policy agendas found that -- in terms of legislative issues affecting the
prerogatives of tax-exempt activities -- they differed less from their brethren on the right
than they had supposed. Even if disinclined to accommodate conservatives,
circumstances, particularly the proliferation of conservative foundations, think tanks, and
charitable entities, compelled them to do so -- or risk encouraging the establishment of
conservative rivals. The shift at the Council on Foundations was dramatic: the old liberal
crew that had edited Foundation News was replaced by staff that focused its successor,
Foundation News and Commentary, on professional and corporate issues rather than
public policy. While the change at INDEPENDENT SECTOR was less dramatic, with the
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retirement of Brian O'Connell, the organization assumed a far lower profile on public
policy matters, emphasizing its commitment to voluntarism, giving, and community
service.
In the midst of welfare reform, a variety of groups -- left, right, and center -- vied
to speak for philanthropy. On the right, Lamar Alexander chaired a Task Force on
Philanthropy and Civic Renewal, that commissioned working papers and convened
sympathetic philanthropic and political notables. On the left, the liberal Nathan
Cummings Foundation sponsored papers and sought to gain progressive philanthropy a
national voice through relationships to liberal periodicals like the American Prospect --
while the Center for Responsive Philanthropy (the descendant of the dissenting Donee
Group of Filer Commission members and consultants) issued scathing evaluations of
welfare reform.
But in the center, more significantly, staid policy groups like the American
Assembly, working closely with INDEPENDENT SECTOR and Indiana University's
Center on Philanthropy, strove to forge a set of common goals for the nonprofit sector
that would bring philanthropic factions together. The 1998 Assembly met, appropriately
enough, at one of the great shrines of post-liberal philanthropy -- the Getty Center in Los
Angeles. After the presentation of a two dozen papers by scholars and philanthropic
leaders, the Assembly issued its final report. In it, concerns with race and gender issues --
the "hot button" concerns of mid-century philanthropy -- were nowhere to be found.  And,
though passing reference was made to growing disparities of wealth, they were mentioned
affirmatively -- as presenting new opportunities for the rich-grown-richer to disseminate
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their wealth more generously and imaginatively (Clotfelter & Erlich 1999). At the end of
the century, the leaders of the philanthropic mainstream had clearly moved back into the
conservative channels that had characterized it at the century's beginning.
National philanthropic leaders, liberal and conservative, may have succeeded in
affirming a shared agenda, but the question remains as to whether it has any particular
relevance to the future of giving and volunteering in the America of the twenty-first
century. There are, for example, very real questions as to whether the creators of the vast
new wealth generated by the entrepreneurial pioneers of the new communications and
information technologies will show any inclination to heed the call of the philanthropic
"mainstream." To be sure, a handful of magnates like Ted Turner and Bill Gates have
begun donating enormous sums to national and international causes, as well as a
willingness to use conventional instrumentalities, such as foundations, to dispense their
largesse. But the vast majority of the newly wealthy not only seem to be reluctant to give,
but, when they do so, prefer less conventional means and objects.
Conclusion: Beyond the Welfare State?
For all the rhetoric of the past two decades about "ending the welfare state as we
know it," an overview of the institutional architecture of the twentieth century fin-de-
siècle suggests an intensification of trends rather than a shift in direction.
Part of the challenge in grasping this is the proposition that, as suggested at the
beginning of this essay, we never full understood the kind of welfare state we had created.
In fact, what appeared to be Big Government based on central state bureaucracies turned
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out to be a directive and allocational state that depended on states, localities, and private
sector actors to carry out its mandates.
In the end, all the much vaunted (and feared) Reagan and "conservative"
revolutions seem to have accomplished is, via "devolution," to give states a greater role in
the allocation of tax federal revenues (which are still primarily gathered through national
mechanisms) and in setting policy guidelines for welfare, education, and other social
programs. Privatization -- out-sourcing public agency functions to private sector firms --
has meant little more than giving official recognition to trends that were already long-
established.
A great deal of attention has been given to "charitable choice" and other features
of welfare reform that seem to broach the historic "wall of separation" between church
and state. But the reality is that contemporary church-state relationships (and the court
rulings that have sanctioned them) really represent little more than a return to patterns of
church-state cooperation in service provision that prevailed in most parts of the United
States before the second World War.11 In fact, this shift can be viewed as an extension of
the earlier efforts through which government effectively took over the domain of donative
voluntary associations and transformed them into quasi-governmental entities.
In light of these institutional continuities, it hardly comes as a surprise to find the
role of the organizational fields of interrelated agencies, congressional staffs, think tanks,
advocacy groups, foundations, and mass membership/industry associations that arose in
the earlier phases of the development of the post-World War II welfare state
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undiminished in significance. Indeed, the role of special interests, many of them using the
nonprofit form acting as conduits for donated funds -- including political monies, hard
and soft -- seems considerably greater now than at any time in the past.
If there is significant qualitative change to be found, it seems to consist of the
disappearance of philanthropic commitment to building and maintaining broad civic
capacity -- and its replacement by narrower commitments to institutions and causes that
benefit particular geographic or demographic segments of the population. As early as the
mid-1980s, efforts to assess the impact of the 1969 Tax Reform Act found that, while tax
reform had not appreciably slowed the growth of foundations, the areas showing the
greatest expansion were in the South and West (rather than in traditional centers in the
Northeast and Upper Midwest) and that philanthropy was more likely to be focused on
local and regional rather than national objectives.12 More recently, studies of giving by
wealthy information and communications technology entrepreneurs suggests an
orientation to locally-based "hands-on" philanthropy that would be more amenable to
measurable and tangible outcomes (Bengali 1999; MacDonald 1999; Van Slambrouck
1999; Ignatius 1999). This may well be expressive of the distaste for conventional forms
of civic engagement among the new class of "knowledge workers" observed by Peter
Drucker in 1989.
At the end of the second World War, as the modern American welfare state first
began to emerge, the United States was still very much a nation of voluntary associations
and people who joined, actively participated, and supported these entities with donations
of time and money. Most of these (including religious denominations, fraternal/sororal
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associations, veterans groups, health charities, professional societies, and so on) were
"national associations" -- federated entities headquartered nationally, but with state and
local chapters and subunits. By the 1990s, most of these were dead or dying -- and in their
place had grown a vast universe of free-standing, autonomous charitable tax-exempt
nonprofits in which membership was nominal and most of whose revenues came directly
or indirectly from a mix of government grants, contracts, vouchers, and earned income
from sales of goods and services.
The shift from the PTA to the PTO as the primary forum for parental involvement
with schools captures the nature of this transformation (Crawford & Leavitt, 1999). The
PTA was a national membership body with associated state and local organizations, as
well as chapters in virtually every school in the country. It served as an important forum
not only for shaping national and local educational priorities, and for disseminating
information about educational issues, but also as a common meeting ground for
professional educators and parents. PTOs, which have largely replaced the PTA, are
autonomous bodies that function as parent auxiliaries for particular schools. While they
depend on voluntary contributions of time and money, they have no connections to other
schools in their communities or to state or national bodies. What was once a broad and
inclusive civic arena has become a privatized and insular enclave.
In 1995, Harvard political scientist Robert Putnam's drew a bleak portrait of these
trends in his provocative 1995 essay "Bowling Alone." Though he treated the
proliferation of nonprofits as a symptom (and in certain ways, a cause) of declining civic
engagement, he may have been too quick to dismiss their significance. To be sure, the
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enclaving and privatization of broadly inclusive civic domains does appear to spell the
end of public life as we have known it since the mid-nineteenth century. But it may not
portend the end of public life as-such. In contrast to Putnam, Peter Drucker's more
sanguine portrayal of a society in which individuals create and participate in privatized
expressive enclaves in which they can acquire and exercise civic skills, act efficaciously,
and to which they can devote their energies and resources points to a form of civil society
that is certainly different from the Tocquevillian ideal, but is a no less valid model of
civic interaction.
Again, it is worth reflecting on contemporary religion scholarship that has shown
how social and economic changes, in eroding transgenerational loyalties to particular
faiths and encouraging individualized searches for spiritual communities, led to the
decline of denominational religion since the 1950s (Roof & McKinney, 1987; Roof,
1993; Wuthnow, 1986, 1998). But the decline of the religious "mainline" by no means
has meant that America has become indifferent to religion. As free-standing
congregations, parachurches, self-help groups, and other alternative forms of spirituality
and devotional activity have proliferated, many commentators now consider the nation to
be undergoing a religious renaissance comparable to the other great "awakenings" of the
past.
The reality is that the "civic space" whose disappearance Putnam and others decry
-- like "mainline" religion and national associations like the PTA -- is only one way of
configuring public life. The notion of a "common good" defined and defended by the
disinterested "experts" of the twentieth century or the "wealthy, learned, and respectable"
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of the nineteenth is a time and class-bound notion that, even at the Republic's beginnings,
represented but one of several ways of enabling citizens to act collectively.
Because of his commitment to equality (and his keen sense of what placed it at
hazard), Jefferson defined the "common good" as comprising no more than the sum of
individual goods. Thus, while foremost among those defending the rights of individuals
to assemble, worship, and speak as they pleased, was also a determined opponent of
efforts to extend these personal freedoms to organizations. As he wrote to New
Hampshire Governor Christopher Plumer in regard to the state's efforts to reorganize
Dartmouth College,
the idea that institutions, established for the use of the nation, cannot be touched
or modified even to make them answer their end, because of rights gratuitously
supposed to  be in those employed to manage them in trust for the public, may,
perhaps, be a salutary provision against the abuses of a monarch, but it is most
absurd against the nation itself. Yet our lawyers and priests generally inculcate
this doctrine; and suppose that preceding generations held the earth more freely
than we do; had a right to impose laws on us, unalterable by ourselves; and that
we, in a like manner, can make laws and impose burdens on future generations,
which they will have no right to alter; in fine, that the earth belongs to the dead,
but not to the living. . . (Jefferson 1816).
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Jefferson's views were embraced by most Americans outside of New England -- which
accounts for the relative scarcity of private philanthropy and endowed institutions outside
the Northeast before the twentieth century.
The alternative view of the "common good" -- as more than the sum of individual
goods -- advanced by Federalists like Timothy Dwight, who argued that it could only be
attained under the guidance of enlightened and learned political and religious leadership.
This model eventually became dominant, with the emergence of the organized
professions, the research university, and the widespread adoption of bureaucratic
organizational forms in government, business, and eleemosynary enterprise (Frederickson
1965; Weibe 1967; Galambos 1970, 1983; Sklar, 1988). Its ultimate triumph depended
less on the will of the unruly electorate or the turbulent marketplace than on the strategic
philanthropic giving and organization-building of New England elites, who well
understood the advantages philanthropic institutions offered the electorally
disenfranchised for exercising power and influence.13
With the emergence of powerful professional and managerial elites at the
beginning of the twentieth century, the accepted conception of public life came
increasingly to be identified with private philanthropic and philanthropically-supported
institutions. The central irony of civil privatism was that the essential condition for its
success -- its emphasis on inclusion based on merit -- was also the instrument of its
undoing, as talented outsiders, Catholics, Jews, and non-northern Europeans, began to
push members of old elites from positions of leadership in the 1960s. This ultimately
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forced the Establishment to shift its conception of the "common good" in a more
privatized direction -- and, along with it, its philanthropic agenda.
Taken together, these trends powerfully underscore the hazards of our using time-
bound concepts and standards to measure and assess fundamental institutional changes.
Among the most hallowed of these concepts (and the standard by which we distinguish
altruism from self-interest) has been the boundary between public and private action.
Viewed ahistorically, this boundary seems universal and absolute. Viewed historically, it
is clear that clear demarcation of public and private domains only began to emerge in
certain western European legal systems in the seventeenth century and only received
unambiguous codification in the post-Revolutionary declarations of rights in American
state constitutions, in the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution, and in
the Supreme Court's 1819 Dartmouth College decision, which definitively extended the
First Amendment right of assembly into a constitutionally inviolable right to form
associations. (It hardly seems coincidental that the delineation of the public-private
boundary coincided with the rise of the modern nation state and modern economic
institutions).
But even these epochal gestures did not translate automatically into an unlimited
right to make philanthropic donations -- the very essence of what we consider to be
"private initiatives in the public interest." The federal courts hesitated to give private
citizens this power until 1844, in its landmark ruling in the Girard Will case. The states
were even more hesitant. Until an overhaul of its charities laws in the early 1890s, New
York courts routinely overturned charitable bequests deemed not to be in the public
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interest and its legislature strictly limited both the size of institutional endowments and
the proportion of a decedent’s estate that could be left to charity. As late as the mid-
1920s, Mississippi entirely forbade bequests of real estate or money for religious or
charitable purposes (Zollman 1924, 45-46).
A decade ago, Lester Salamon pointed out the ways in which defective
"conceptual lenses" had impaired our ability to grasp the importance of relationships
between nonprofits and government (Salamon 1987). Far more serious distortions result
from our use of such defective lenses to view the boundaries between public and private
domains and the institutions and practices whose existence is contingent on the location
of those boundaries -- philanthropy, volunteering, associations, corporations, and so on.
While contemporary statutes and regulations may clearly demarcate
charitable/philanthropic and mutual benefit activities the reality is that this distinction,
like the public private distinction, is of relatively recent origin.
At the end of the nineteenth century, the tax laws of Massachusetts and a number
of other states accorded equal exemption privileges to all membership organizations,
making no distinction between such mutual benefit associations as fraternal and sororal
lodges, mutual savings banks and insurance companies, and athletic organizations and
such charitable, educational, and religious organizations as colleges and congregations. In
contrast, states like Pennsylvania offered tax exemption only to entities that could
demonstrate devotion of a substantial proportion of their activities gratis to those in need.
A more or less common standard of tax treatment only emerged after the second World
War, incident to the universalization of income taxation -- and there are indications that
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uniform practice is currently in eclipse, as states have begun assessing the high cost of
subsidizing "charitable" enterprises that are, in fact, largely commercial operations.14
Trends in tax and regulatory treatment may take decades to evolve, but their extent and
significance cannot be ignored -- especially because, in the aggregate, they are the
elements of how distinctions between public and private and altruistic and self-interested
come to be institutionalized.
In conclusion, it appears that the real history of American philanthropy and the
organizations and movements supported by giving and volunteering has yet to be written.
Until we can place these activities within a fully inclusive understanding of how
Americans have carried out collective endeavors -- including, most importantly, the tasks
of self-government -- our historical accounts will consist of little more than myths written
to justify the efforts of particular social groups to maintain or claim power.
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ENDNOTES
1. My studies of organizational populations show a massive die-off of traditional
voluntary associations and their replacement by charitable tax-exempt entities in
the decades following the second World War (Hall 1999).
2. In the aftermath of the Princeton Conference, generous funding -- chiefly by the
Ford Foundation -- produced an outpouring of seminal studies, including Curti's
own American Philanthropy Abroad (1963) and Philanthropy in the Shaping of
Higher Education (1965), his colleague Irvin Wyllie's work on the legal history of
philanthropy (1959), and dissertations and monographs by their students,
including Howard S. Miller (1961; 1964), John Lankford (1962), James Howell
Smith (1968), and Victor Thiessen (1968). Ford and Sage funding also supported
work at Harvard by Professor Winthrop K. Jordan [who wrote five important
studies of British philanthropy (1959; 1960a; 1960b; 1962a; 1962b)], David
Edward Owen (1965; 1982), and graduate students Daniel M. Fox and Neil
Harris, who wrote important studies of museums and the arts in America (Fox,
1963. 1995; Harris, 1966, 1981, 1990, 1993, 1996), Helen Lefkowitz Horowitz,
whose 1969 dissertation on cultural philanthropy was only the first of her
contributions to the literature on American institutional life (1976, 1984, 1987).
Funding catalyzed by the Princeton Conference also led to the publication of a
number of pioneering monographs by scholars at other institutions, including
University of Georgia communications scholar, Scott M. Cutlip's Fund Raising in
the United States (1965). Clifford Griffin's study of stewardship (1965), and
Robert M. Bremner's American Philanthropy (1960; see also 1980).
3. To be fair to the social scientists of the era, they did recognize aspects of the new
public-private synergies. Certainly, Mills's identification of the "military-industrial
complex" pointed to a highly selective awareness of new relationships between
public and private domains. Criticism of the "revolving doors" between regulatory
agencies and the industries they regulated identified an important aspect of these
relationships.
4. The "organizational field" presents an invaluable alternative to such units of
analysis as firms, industries, and sector. Social theorists Paul DiMaggio and
Walter Powell define an organizational field as "those organizations that, in the
aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource
and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce
similar services or products." The virtue of this unit of analysis, they argue, "is
that it directs our attention not simply to competing firms. . . but to the totality of
relevant actors" (DiMaggio & Powell 1989, 65). Moreover, it invites attention to a
greater range of organizational behavior -- including efforts to maximize utilities
other than profits (legitimacy, certainty).
The organizational field is a peculiarly useful framework for viewing complex and
extensive interorganizational relationships that would remain invisible to other
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forms of analysis -- especially relationships across institutional domains
(government/business/nonprofit).
5. Typical of this pattern are the careers of such notables as John Foster Dulles, John
Gardner, Robert MacNamara, Dean Rusk, the Bundys, and Henry Kissinger, all of
whom who moved easily between foundation and corporate boardrooms and
executive suites, university faculty and administrative positions, and high
appointments in government.
6. This was not a new charge. Similar fears had been expressed by the Walsh
Commission in 1913, whose staff sharply questioned Andrew Carnegie, John D.
Rockefeller, and other early foundation philanthropists -- and by the TNEC
(Temporary National Economic Committee) in the late 1930s. In contrast,
congressional investigators of the early 1950s were more concerned about the
political and cultural influence of foundations than their economic impact.
7. Patman's investigatory reports included: The Power and Influence of Large
Foundations (U.S. Congress 1961a); Foundations Fail to Give Adequate
Financial Reports (U.S. Congress 1961b); IRS Needs Sharper Tools (U.S.
Congress 1961c); Tax Exempt Foundations and Charitable Trusts: Their Impact
on Our Economy  (U.S. Congress 1962); Tax Exempt Foundations and Charitable
Trusts: Their Impact on Our Economy, Second Installment  (U.S. Congress
1963)Tax-Exempt Foundations: Their Impact on Small Business, Third
Installment (U.S. Congress 1964); Tax Exempt Foundations and Charitable
Trusts: Their Impact on Our Economy, Fourth Installment  (U.S. Congress 1966);
Tax Exempt Foundations and Charitable Trusts: Their Impact on Our Economy,
Fifth Installment  (U.S. Congress 1967); Tax Exempt Foundations: Their Impact
on Small Business (U.S. Congress 1967); and Foundations and Charitable Trusts:
Their Impact on Our Economy, Sixth Installment (U.S. Congress 1968).
8. Emerson Andrews relates the difficulties he encountered in gathering
information on grantmaking foundations for the first edition of the Foundation
Directory. Before the mid-1960s, the only national organization of foundations
was the Council of Community Foundations organized by
9. Although classified by the IRS as a 501(c)(3) charitable and educational entity, IS
was organized like a trade association, with membership restricted to nonprofits
that carried out their activities on a national scale. This necessarily restricted
membership to large grantmakers and a handful of large charitable federations and
advocacy groups. Since the vast majority of the nation's nonprofits were locally
based -- or were chapters of large organizations like the Red Cross and the
national health charities.
10. This critical strand did not, however, escape the vigilance of INDEPENDENT
SECTOR's Chair, Brian O'Connell, who described Hansmann's ideas about the
nonprofit sector to assembled notables at a dinner following the first Spring
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Research Forum as "the stupidest thing that I have ever heard." This led John
Simon and Paul DiMaggio to write a lengthy memorandum taking him to task for
"derisory remarks made not at the panel session in which Henry participated --
where he could have responded -- but in a forum where he was not present to
explain himself and in front of a distinguished group of researchers and other
individuals professionally concerned with the quality of research on the
independent sector." An account of this interchange can be found in John G.
Simon and Paul J. DiMaggio to Brian O'Connell 7/13/1983, PONPO files.
Later, highly selective readings of Hansmann's public goods, contract failure, and
market failure rationales for nonprofits became -- somewhat to Hansmann's
annoyance -- the closest thing to an orthodoxy that the new nonprofits field had to
offer.
11. Between the 1880s, when the U.S. Supreme Court declared the
United States to be a "Christian Nation," and World War II, church-state
relationships were cooperative and supportive and clergy -- particularly Protestant
clergy -- played prominent roles in public life. Only after the war did an
increasingly activist (and religiously diverse) federal judiciary begin reaffirming
the "wall of separation" between the two. On this, see Handy, Undermined
Establishment: Church-State Relations in America, 1880-1920 (1991).
11. On this, see Teresa Odendahl (ed.), America's Wealthy and the Future of
Foundations
(1987) and Charity Begins at Home: Generosity and Self-Interest among the
Philanthropic Elite (1991). In response to these shifts, the Council on Foundations
launched an effort to convene local and regional philanthropic communities
throughout the country. These shifts not only reflect the tremendous growth of
economies in these regions after 1960, but also the willingness of wealthy
conservatives who had traditionally resisted foundation philanthropy to embrace
it.
12. For an example of the clarity with which members of New England's upper
classes understood the potential of philanthropy and voluntary associations as a
counterpoise to democracy, see William Ellery Channing's essay, "Associations"
(1829). For a wonderful case study of how these instrumentalities were used to
exert control over forms of popular cultural that flourished through market
patronage, see Edward Everett's account of the Lowell Institute (Everett 1840;
Weeks 1966; Story 1981). See also Paul J. DiMaggio's important study of elite
use of nonprofit organizations in Boston's musical culture later in the nineteenth
century (1986).
14. At this point, most states began accepting federal grants of exempt status as the
desideratum for exemptions from state and local sales and property levies. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's landmark 1985 decision in the Hospital Utilization
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Project Case represented a dramatic break from this practice, when the court
boldly declared
the mere fact that an organization is a nonprofit corporation does not
mandate that it be exempt from taxation. . . . This fact is immaterial and
not controlling since we are not bound by Federal determinations as to the
charitable character of a school. More important, however, standards
applied under the Federal statute are totally different from those under the
Pennsylvania statute. . . (Hospital Utilization Project 1985).
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Total nonprofits (NPOs) and charitable nonprofits
[101s and 501©3s] registered with the Internal Revenue
Service, 1939-1996.
YEAR TOTAL NPOS 101s & 501(c)3S
1939 12,500
1943 80,250 17,450
1946 93,458 27,500
1950 32,000
1967 309,000
1968 358,000
1969 416,000 138,000
1972 535,000
1973 630,000
1974 673,000
1975 692,000
1976 763,000 260,000
1977 790,000 276,000
1978 810,000 294,000
1979 825,000 304,000
1980 846,000 320,000
1981 851,000 328,000
1982 841,000 323,000
1983 845,000 336,000
1984 871,000 353,000
1985 887,000 366,000
1986 897,424 487,183
1987 939,105 522,751
1988 969,177 489.952
1989 992,561 490.129
1990 1,024,766 484,000
1991 1,055,545 512,551
1992 1,085,206 530,592
1993 1,118,131 542,969
1994 1,138,598 522,000
1995 1,164,789 560,057
1996 1,188,510 573,265
Source, Historical Statistics of the United States,
Millennial Edition (in press)
